Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts by Klaus, Bettina & Walzl, Markus
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
Bettina Klaus∗ Markus Walzl†
August 2007
Abstract
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with
contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable
allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from
obtaining “set inclusion results” on all three domains, we prove that for substitutable
preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings is nonempty and coincides with the set of
weakly setwise stable matchings. For strongly substitutable preferences the set of pairwise
stable matchings coincides with the set of setwise stable matchings.
JEL classiﬁcation: C62, C78, D78, J41.
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching, Matching with Contracts, Pairwise Stability, Setwise
Stability.
1 Introduction
We consider a general class of two-sided many-to-many matching markets, so-called matching
with contracts markets (Roth, 1984b).1 The matching with contracts model contains classical
two-sided matching markets such as marriage and college admissions markets (e.g., Gale
and Shapley, 1962), job matching markets (e.g., Kelso and Crawford, 1982),2 and certain
auction markets (e.g., Hatﬁeld and Milgrom, 2005). Throughout the article, without loss of
generality, we model matching markets with contracts as trading platforms where buyers and
sellers interact: there is a set of bilateral contracts between buyers and sellers that specify the
trading conditions (e.g., the set of items that are bought/sold, delivery dates, prices, service
agreements, etc.). Moreover, buyers as well as sellers can trade with more than one agent on
the other side of the market at the same time. The agents’ strict preferences over (feasible,
legal, etc.) sets of contracts or allocations completes the description of a many-to-many
matching market with contracts.
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1Closely related markets are many-to-one matching markets with contracts (e.g., Hatﬁeld and Milgrom,
2005) and many-to-many matching markets (e.g., Echenique and Oviedo, 2006; Konishi and ¨ Unver, 2006;
Sotomayor, 1999).
2Roth and Sotomayor (1990) give a comprehensive and complete survey of these and related two-sided
matching models up to 1990.
1Stability is the central solution requirement derived from empirical as well as theoretical
studies (e.g., Roth, 1982, 1984a, 1991). Loosely speaking, an allocation of contracts is “stable”
if it is individually rational [no buyer or seller would prefer to cancel some of her contracts]
and satisﬁes a no blocking requirement. There are various ways for a set of agents to block a
given allocation of contracts:
• pairwise blocking: a buyer and a seller would like to add a new joint contract or replace
a previous joint contract while possibly canceling other contracts;
• setwise blocking: a set of buyers and sellers would like to implement a new set of
contracts among themselves while possibly canceling other contracts.
In the case of setwise blocking, the blocking requirement can be reﬁned by imposing extra
conditions on when a set of agents is allowed to block a given allocation of contracts:
• strongly setwise blocking describes the minimal requirement for any setwise blocking (it
is the benchmark without extra conditions): the agents in the blocking coalition should
be better oﬀ with the new sets of contracts they receive through blocking;
• setwise blocking: the set of new contracts is a strong setwise block and individually
rational;
• weakly setwise blocking: the set of new contracts is a setwise block, but blocking can
only occur if agents in the blocking coalition receive their best set of contracts from the
new and the previous contracts.
Clearly, the various setwise blocking concepts diﬀer with respect to the admissibility of
a blocking coalition. While strong setwise blocks only require an improvement upon the
status quo, setwise blockings also require that the blocking allocation is individually rational
(i.e., that none of the members of the blocking coalition has an incentive to cancel contracts
unilaterally). Finally, weak setwise blocks require that there is no conﬂict in the blocking
coalition (i.e., all members of the blocking coalition obtain their best set of contracts among
their original contracts and the new contracts of the blocking coalition.). Weak setwise-
stability is a new stability concept that, as we will demonstrate in the paper, bridges the gap
between pairwise stability and previously considered setwise stability notions.
For many matching models various of the blocking notions coincide (see for instance
Hatﬁeld and Milgrom’s, 2005, many-to-one matching markets with contracts). Sotomayor
(1999) demonstrates that for many-to-many matching markets notions of pairwise and setwise
stability indeed diﬀer.
As Echenique and Oviedo (2006, page 233) point out, “Many-to-many matching markets
are understood less well than many-to-one markets ...”. In our opinion, one of the reasons is
that diﬀerent stability notions are used in various papers while their relationships are not well
understood. After a description of the model, we therefore ﬁrst introduce pairwise stability
and the various notions of setwise stability as implied by the blocking requirements listed
before. Then, the set of pairwise (weakly setwise, etc.) stable allocations equals the set of all
allocations that cannot be pairwise (weakly setwise, etc.) blocked.
2We then analyze the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for various
standard preference domains and obtain the following set inclusion results:
• general preferences: strongly setwise stable allocations ⊆ setwise stable allocations ⊆
weakly setwise stable allocations ⊆ pairwise stable allocations;
• substitutable preferences: strongly setwise stable allocations ⊆ setwise stable allocations
⊆ weakly setwise stable allocations = pairwise stable allocations;
• strongly substitutable preferences: strongly setwise stable allocations ⊆ setwise stable
allocations = weakly setwise stable allocations = pairwise stable allocations.
Apart from surveying set inclusion results on all three domains, we prove that for substi-
tutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings is nonempty and coincides with the
set of weakly setwise stable matchings. Hence weakly setwise stable matchings do exist for
substitutable preferences, and weak setwise stability is indeed a setwise stability concept in
between the familiar pairwise stability and previously considered setwise stability notions.
For strongly substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings coincides with
the set of setwise stable matchings. Finally, we demonstrate that all set inclusion results are
tight (Examples 1, 3, and 4).
2 Many-to-Many Matching Markets with Contracts
2.1 Buyers, Sellers, and Contracts
We consider a model, in which buyers and sellers are matched to each other (alternatively,
we could model many-to-many matching markets with contracts as job-matching markets or
matching markets where clients are assigned to consultancy ﬁrms). Let B denote the ﬁnite
set of buyers, S the ﬁnite set of sellers, and N = B ∪ S the set of agents. By b we denote a
generic buyer, by s a generic seller, and by i,j generic agents.
We model the typical features of a many-to-many matching market with contracts by
assuming that each buyer can buy from several sellers and each seller can sell to several buyers.
A (bilateral) contract speciﬁes a trade between one buyer and one seller and further terms of
trade such as, for instance, the set and quantity of items sold, the price, postal and handling
fees, delivery time, guarantees for the product and delivery, and service agreements. Formally
the set of contracts is described by a set X in connection with a mapping µ = (µB,µS) : X →
B × S that speciﬁes the bilateral structure of each contract. So, for any contract x ∈ X,
µ(x) = (b,s) means that contract x is established between buyer b and seller s. Note that
for two contracts x,x0 ∈ X,x 6= x0, with µ(x) = µ(x0), x and x0 specify diﬀerent contract
terms between the same buyer and seller. By Xi = {x ∈ X | µ(x) = (i,s) or µ(x) = (b,i)}
we denote the set of contracts that involve agent i.
If all sellers oﬀer the same set of contract speciﬁcations K to all buyers, then the set of
contracts X can be represented as a Cartesian product X = B ×S ×K. An example of such
a contract speciﬁcation K would be a price scale that all sellers of a standardized product
employ. However, note that sellers may not necessarily use the same contract speciﬁcation:
sellers may sell diﬀerent types and numbers of products and even if they sell the same stan-
dardized products, a seller who is further away may have to charge higher shipment costs
3than a seller who is located closer to the buyer. For each agent it is always possible to reject
any set of contracts, that is to not buy or sell certain items. We refer to the speciﬁc situation
in which an agent does not buy or sell any item as a null contract, denoted by ∅.
As a special case consider pure matching contracts, i.e., any contract only consists of a
match between a buyer and a seller such that X = {(b,s) ∈ B ×S}. This restricts our model
to many-to-many matching markets as analyzed in Sotomayor (1999), Echenique and Oviedo
(2006), and Konishi and ¨ Unver (2006).
2.2 Buyers’ and Sellers’ Preferences
No buyer b is allowed to have more than one contract with a certain seller at the same time
(buying several items from one seller is summarized in a single contract). Therefore, we deﬁne
the set of feasible contracts for buyer b by Xb := {X0 ⊆ Xb | for all s ∈ S,|X0 ∩ Xs| ≤ 1}.
Symmetrically to the buyers, no seller s is allowed to have more than one contract with a buyer
at the same time (selling several items to the same buyer is summarized in a single contract).
The set of feasible contracts for seller s is Xs := {X0 ⊆ Xs | for all b ∈ B,|X0 ∩ Xb| ≤ 1}.
Note that for each agent i the null contract is always feasible, i.e., ∅ ∈ Xi, and that
X0 ∈ Xi implies for all Y 0 ⊆ X0, Y 0 ∈ Xi. Each agent i has a total (linear) order over sets
of feasible contracts Xi represented by a preference relation Ri.3 Given X0,Y 0 ∈ Xi, X0 Pi Y 0
means that agent i strictly prefers the set of contracts X0 to the set of contacts Y 0; X0 Ri Y 0
means that X0 Pi Y 0 or X0 = Y 0 and that agent i weakly prefers the set of contracts X0 to
the set of contacts Y 0. We denote the set of all possible total orders for agent i by Ri. Since
preference relation Ri ∈ Ri is a total order, it induces a well-deﬁned choice correspondence
Ci : 2X → Xi that assigns to each set of contracts X0 ⊆ X agent i’s most preferred feasible set
of contracts available for her in X0∪{∅}, i.e., for all X0 ⊆ X, Ci(X0) ∈ Xi, Ci(X0) ⊆ X0∪{∅},
and there is no Y ⊆ X0, Y ∈ Xi, with Y Pi Ci(X0).
After having introduced the domain of general preferences, we will introduce two domains
that have played an important role in two-sided matching, namely substitutability and strong
substitutability: see for instance Echenique and Oviedo (2006) who also use these domains
to analyze the relation between various solution concepts such as (setwise) stable allocations
and core(-like) solutions.
2.3 Substitutability
Loosely speaking, an agent has substitutable preferences if she does not consider comple-
mentarities in the sets of contracts. To be precise, the condition for substitutable preference
states that if a contract is chosen by an agent from some set of contracts, then that contract
is still chosen by the agent from a smaller set of contracts that include it. Formally, agent i’s
preferences Ri are substitutable if
(SUB) for all sets of contracts X0 ⊆ Y 0 ⊆ X: X0 ∩ Ci(Y 0) ⊆ Ci(X0).
Equivalently one can formulate substitutability as follows (Hatﬁeld and Milgrom, 2005).
3In other words, Ri represents a binary relation that satisﬁes antisymmetry (for all X
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4If a contract is not chosen by an agent from some set of contracts, then that contract is
still not chosen by the agent from a larger set of contracts. For any set of contracts X0 ⊆ X,
NCi(X0) := X0 \ Ci(X0) denotes the set of all contracts that are not chosen from set X0 by
choice correspondence Ci. One can easily prove that condition (SUB) is equivalent to the
following condition (SUB’).
(SUB’) For all sets of contracts X0 ⊆ Y 0 ⊆ X: NCi(X0) ⊆ NCi(Y 0).
2.4 Strong Substitutability
Essentially, the strong substitutable preference condition (Echenique and Oviedo, 2006) states
that if a contract is chosen by an agent from some set of contracts, then that contract is still
chosen by the agent from a worse set of contracts that include it. We ﬁrst have to extend
Echenique and Oviedo’s deﬁnition of strong substitutability for many-to-many matching mar-
kets to many-to-many matching markets with contracts.
Let i be an agent who participates in a many-to-many matching market. Recall that
in such a “pure” matching market exactly one contract between any buyer and any seller
exists. Hence, all subsets of Xi are automatically feasible and one can easily extend agent i’s
preferences to all subsets of X: for X0,Y 0 ⊆ X, (X0 ∩ Xi) Pi (Y 0 ∩ Xi) implies X0 Pi Y 0.
When allowing for diﬀerent contracts between buyers and sellers, not all subsets of Xi
are feasible anymore and the agent’s strict preferences over feasible contract sets cannot be
straightforwardly extended to strict preferences over all subsets of Xi. Thus, while Echenique
and Oviedo (2006) can simply use the strict preference relation of an agent to compare two
sets of contracts X0 and Y 0, we have to use the agent’s choice function to avoid having to
extend preferences to compare sets of contracts that are not feasible.4
Formally, agent i’s preferences Ri are strongly substitutable if
(SSUB) for all sets of contracts X0,Y 0 ⊆ X such that Ci(Y 0)PiCi(X0): X0∩Ci(Y 0) ⊆ Ci(X0).
For many-to-many matching markets, our deﬁnition coincides with that of Echenique and
Oviedo (2006). Equivalently one can formulate strong substitutability as follows. If a contract
is not chosen by an agent from some set of contracts, then that contract is still not chosen by
the agent from a set of contracts she considers better according to her choice function. One
can easily prove that condition (SSUB) is equivalent to the following condition (SSUB’).
(SSUB’) For all sets of contracts X0,Y 0 ⊆ X such that Ci(Y 0) Pi Ci(X0): NCi(X0) ∩ Y 0 ⊆
NCi(Y 0).
It is clear that if preferences are strongly substitutable, then they are also substitutable. For a
discussion of strong substitutability in comparison to other classical matching domain restric-
tions (e.g., separability and/or responsiveness) see Echenique and Oviedo (2006, Section 6.3).
2.5 Allocations in Many-to-Many Matching Markets with Contracts
Since the set of contracts X and the set of agents N remain ﬁxed throughout this study,
we denote a (many-to-many) matching market (with contracts) by a preference proﬁle R =
(Ri)i∈N. The set of all preference proﬁles is denoted by R.
4We could also use the following preference extension: for X
0,Y





5For any set of contracts A ⊆ X and any agent i we denote by Ai = A ∩ Xi all contracts
in A that involve agent i. An allocation is a set of contracts A ⊆ X such that (i) for any
buyer b, [Ab ∈ Xb] and [x ∈ Ab ∩ Xs implies x ∈ As] and (ii) for any seller s, [As ∈ Xs] and
[x ∈ As ∩ Xb implies x ∈ Ab].
We denote the set of allocations by A. Clearly, all preference relations Ri induce weak
preferences over allocations in a natural way. We use the same notation for preferences over
feasible contract sets and allocations: for all agents i ∈ N and allocations A,A0 ∈ A, A Ri A0
if and only if Ai Ri A0
i.
3 Pairwise and Setwise Stability
As described in the Introduction, an important criterion for an allocation to be accepted as
ﬁnal outcome is stability. Next, we introduce various notions of stability.
3.1 Individual Rationality and Pairwise Stability
First, since the matching markets we consider here are based on voluntary participation, a
necessary condition for allocation A to be stable is individual rationality:
At any allocation A each agent i who is assigned a set of contracts Ai 6= ∅ can reject some
or all contracts in Ai. Thus, an allocation A is individually rational for matching market
R ∈ R if for all i ∈ N and X0 ⊆ Ai, Ai Ri X0. Alternatively, A is individually rational if
(IR) for all i ∈ N, Ci(A) = Ai
By IR(R) ⊆ A we denote the set of individually rational allocations for matching market R.
The notion of individual rationality we use here is the same as in Echenique and Oviedo
(2006) or Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2005). Konishi and ¨ Unver (2006) refer to individual ratio-
nality as “individual stability.”
We continue with a weak notion of stability — pairwise stability — that plays a central
role in all previous articles on (many-to-many) matching (e.g., Roth, 1984b; Echenique and
Oviedo, 2006).
Let b ∈ B and s ∈ S, and consider an individually rational allocation A. We deﬁne
pairwise blocking of an allocation A by buyer b and seller s as follows.
Assume that no y ∈ A such that µ(y) = (b,s) exists (buyer b and seller s do not have a
contract at A). Then, b and s can block allocation A if there is a contract x ∈ X, µ(x) = (b,s),
such that b and s strictly prefer adding x to their respective sets of contracts Ab and As while
possibly canceling some contracts at the same time.
Assume that y ∈ A such that µ(y) = (b,s) (buyer b and seller s have a contract at A).
Then, b and s can block allocation A if there is a contract x ∈ X \A, µ(x) = (b,s), such that
b and s strictly prefer replacing y by x in their respective sets of contracts Ab and As while
possibly canceling some contracts at the same time.
A buyer b and a seller s pairwise block an allocation A if
(PB) there exists a contract x ∈ X\A, µ(x) = (b,s), such that x ∈ Cb(A∪x) and x ∈ Cs(A∪x)
— buyer b and seller s would like to implement contract x while possibly canceling contracts
in A.
6An allocation A is pairwise stable if it is individually rational (IR) and no buyer and seller can
pairwise block it [not (PB)]. By PS(R) ⊆ A we denote the set of pairwise stable allocations
for matching market R.
Next, we introduce various notions of setwise stability.
3.2 Strong Setwise Stability
Let B0 ⊆ B, S0 ⊆ S, N0 = B0 ∪S0, and assume that allocation A is individually rational. We
deﬁne strong setwise blocking of an allocation A by the set of agents N0 as follows.
Each member of the blocking coalition N0 can add contracts with members of N0 or
replace existing contracts with members of N0 while possibly canceling other contracts. If all
members of N0 can obtain a better set of contracts by adding, replacing, and/or canceling
contracts as described above, then they can strongly setwise block allocation A.
A set of agents N0 = B0 ∪ S0 strongly setwise blocks an allocation A if
(SSB) there exists a set of contracts X0 ∈ A such that
(1) for all x ∈ X0 \ A, µ(x) ∈ B0 × S0
— new contracts are among the members of the blocking coalition only,
(2) for all i ∈ N0, X0
i Pi Ai
— all members of the blocking coalition receive a better set of contracts, and
(3) for all j ∈ N \ N0, X0
j ⊆ Aj
— agents outside the blocking coalition do not receive new contracts, but possibly some of
their contracts are canceled by members of the blocking coalition.
An allocation A is strongly setwise stable if it is individually rational (IR) and no set of agents
can strongly setwise block it [not (SSB)]. By SSS(R) ⊆ A we denote the set of strongly
setwise stable allocations for matching market R.
Note that from the deﬁnition of strongly setwise blocking (SSB) we can easily construct
a corresponding “blocking allocation A0 ∈ A” deﬁned as follows:
(i) for all i ∈ N0, A0
i = X0
i
— members of the blocking coalition receive their “blocking contract sets” X0
i, and
(ii) for all j ∈ N \ N0,
A0
j = X0
j ∪ {x ∈ Aj | [µ(x) = (j,s) and s ∈ N \ N0] or [µ(x) = (b,j) and b ∈ N \ N0]}
— agents outside the blocking coalition receive all previous contracts with agents outside the
blocking coalition and all previous contracts with the members of the blocking coalition that
were not canceled.
If an allocation A0 is such that some N0 = B0 ∪S0 can strongly setwise block allocation A
with X0 = ∪i∈N0A0
i, then we say that allocation A is strongly setwise blocked via allocation A0.
Our deﬁnition of strong setwise stability corresponds to Konishi and ¨ Unver’s (2006) group
stability.
The requirements of a strongly setwise block are minimal requirements for a blocking
coalition to form. We next discuss two weaker setwise stability notions that are obtained by
adding extra blocking conditions.
73.3 Setwise Stability
If we require that for all members of the blocking coalition the new set of contracts that is
obtained by blocking (the new contracts with members of the blocking coalition and the old
contracts that are kept with agents outside the blocking coalition) is preferred to the old set
of contracts and individually rational, then we obtain the weaker notion of setwise blocking
as, for instance, used in Echenique and Oviedo (2006).
A set of agents N0 = B0 ∪ S0 setwise blocks an allocation A if
(SB) there exists a set of contracts X0 ∈ A such that
(1) for all x ∈ X0 \ A, µ(x) ∈ B0 × S0
— new contracts are among the members of the blocking coalition only,
(2) for all i ∈ N0, X0
i Pi Ai and X0
i = Ci(X0
i),
— all members of the blocking coalition receive a better and individually rational set of
contracts, and
(3) for all j ∈ N \ N0, X0
j ⊆ Aj
— agents outside the blocking coalition do not receive new contracts, but possibly some of
their contracts are canceled by members of the blocking coalition.
An allocation A is setwise stable if it is individually rational (IR) and no set of agents can
setwise block it [not (SB)]. By SS(R) ⊆ A we denote the set of setwise stable allocations for
matching market R.
Note that from the deﬁnition of setwise blocking (SB) we can similarly as in Section 3.2
construct a corresponding blocking allocation A0 ∈ A and deﬁne setwise blocking of allocation
A via allocation A0.
Our deﬁnition of setwise stability corresponds to Echenique and Oviedo’s (2006) setwise
stability. It is closely related to Konishi and ¨ Unver’s (2006) and Sotomayor’s (1999) setwise
stability. The diﬀerence is that we only require individual rationality for the blocking coalition
while Konishi and ¨ Unver (2006) and Sotomayor (1999) require that a setwise blocking results
in an individually rational blocking allocation (hence individual rationality has to hold for all
agents and not only the agents who block). For substitutable preferences these two notions
of setwise stability coincide, but one can easily show that for general preferences our setwise
stability is stronger than Konishi and ¨ Unver’s (2006) and Sotomayor’s (1999) setwise stability
– our setwise blocking notion admits more setwise blockings and therefore in comparison fewer
setwise stable allocations result.
3.4 Weak Setwise Stability
Next, we further strengthen the setwise blocking assumption, and thereby weaken setwise sta-
bility, by requiring that all members of the blocking coalition obtain their best set of contracts
among their original contracts and the new contracts of the blocking coalition. Intuitively,
such a blocking does not create any tension within the blocking coalition and thereby incor-
porates a very basic notion of farsightedness or credibility of a coalitional agreement (e.g., no
member of the blocking coalition is tempted to reestablish a canceled contract).
8A set of agents N0 = B0 ∪ S0 weakly setwise blocks an allocation A if
(WSB) there exists a set of contracts X0 ∈ A such that
(1) for all x ∈ X0 \ A, µ(x) ∈ B0 × S0
— new contracts are among the members of the blocking coalition only,
(2) for all i ∈ N0, X0
i 6= Ai and X0
i = Ci(A ∪ X0),
— all members of the blocking coalition receive their best set of contracts among their original
contracts and the new contracts of the blocking coalition, and
(3) for all j ∈ N \ N0, X0
j ⊆ Aj
— agents outside the blocking coalition do not receive new contracts, but possibly some of
their contracts are canceled by members of the blocking coalition.
An allocation A is weakly setwise stable if it is individually rational (IR) and no set of agents
can weakly setwise block it [not (WSB)]. By WSS(R) ⊆ A we denote the set of weakly setwise
stable allocations for matching market R.
Note that from the deﬁnition of weakly setwise blocking (WSB) we can similarly as in
Section 3.2 construct a corresponding blocking allocation A0 ∈ A and deﬁne weakly setwise
blocking of allocation A via allocation A0.
Weak setwise-stability is a new stability concept that, as we will see in Section 4.2 (Theo-
rem 2), bridges the gap between pairwise stability and previously considered setwise stability
notions.
4 Relations between Stability Notions
4.1 Stability in General
We now show that on the unrestricted preference domain there is a set inclusion relation
between all stability notions which is a straightforward implication of the logical relation
between the blocking concepts. Furthermore, we provide a matching market for which all set
inclusion relations are strict and cite a matching market without pairwise stable allocations.
Theorem 1. The “Onion Structure of Stable Allocations” - General Preferences
(i) For all matching markets R ∈ R, SSS(R) ⊆ SS(R) ⊆ WSS(R) ⊆ PS(R).
(ii) There exist matching markets R ∈ R such that SSS(R)   SS(R)   WSS(R)   PS(R).
(iii) There exist matching markets R ∈ R such that PS(R) = ∅.
Proof. (i) Consider matching market R ∈ R. We assume, without loss of generality, that
allocations A that are blocked are individually rational.
By the deﬁnitions of strongly setwise blocking (SSB) and setwise blocking (SB) it is
clear that any allocation A that is setwise blocked is also strongly setwise blocked. Hence,
SSS(R) ⊆ SS(R).
Assume that allocation A is weakly setwise blocked (WSB), i.e., there exists a coalition
N0 = B0 ∪ S0 and a set of contracts X0 ∈ A such that for all x ∈ X0 \ A, µ(x) ∈ B0 × S0, for
all i ∈ N0, X0
i 6= Ai and X0
i = Ci(A ∪ X0), and for all j ∈ N \ N0, X0
j ⊆ Aj.
9Note that X0
i 6= Ai and X0
i = Ci(A ∪ X0) imply that X0
i Pi Ai. Furthermore, since
X0
i ⊆ (A ∪ X0), X0
i = Ci(A ∪ X0) implies X0
i = Ci(X0
i). So, any allocation A that is weakly
setwise blocked is also setwise blocked. Hence, SS(R) ⊆ WSS(R).
Next, assume that allocation A is pairwise blocked (PB), i.e., there exists a contract
x ∈ X \ A such that µ(x) = (b,s) and x ∈ Cb(A ∪ x) and x ∈ Cs(A ∪ x). Deﬁne B0 := {b},
S0 := {s}, N0 := {b,s}, X0
b := Cb(A ∪ x), X0
s := Cb(A ∪ x), and X0 := X0
b ∪ X0
s. Then,
X0 \ A = {x}, for i ∈ N0, X0




Thus, X0 ⊆ X is such that for all x ∈ X0 \ A, µ(x) ∈ B0 × S0, for all i ∈ N0, X0
i 6= Ai
and X0
i = Ci(A ∪ X0), and for all j ∈ N \ N0, X0
j ⊆ Aj and N0 weakly setwise blocks (WSB)
allocation A. So, any allocation A that is pairwise blocked is also weakly setwise blocked.
Hence, WSS(R) ⊆ PS(R).
(ii) With Example 1 we introduce a matching market R ∈ R such that SSS(R)   SS(R)  
WSS(R)   PS(R).
(iii) Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Example 2.7) presented a matching market (without con-
tracts) to demonstrate that the set of pairwise stable matchings of a many-to-one matching
market can be empty.
Example 1. A “Stable Matching Onion” for General Preferences
We consider a matching market with two buyers and two sellers and a set of contracts X =
{a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k,l,m,n}. Table 1 indicates the bilateral structure of contracts in X.
Table 2 ﬁrst lists agents’ preferences in its columns, e.g., buyer b1’s preferences are such that
ej Pb1 m Pb1 im Pb1 ij Pb1 ef Pb1 ab Pb1 ∅ Pb1 ..., where “...” represents any ordering of the
remaining feasible sets of contracts. Second, we list the following allocations for matching
market R in the rows of Table 2: A = {a,b,c,d}, B = {e,f,g,h}, C = {i,j,k,l}, D =
{i,m,n,l}, and E = {e,j}. Finally, Figure 1 illustrates that for matching market R we have
SSS(R)   SS(R)   WSS(R)   PS(R): it is easy to check that IR(R) = {A,B,C,E}.
Furthermore,
• allocation A is pairwise stable, but weakly setwise blocked via allocation B;
• allocation B is weakly setwise stable, but setwise blocked via allocation C, which is not
a weakly setwise block because Cb1(e,f,i,j) = ej 6= ij;
• allocation C is setwise stable, but strongly setwise blocked via allocation D, which is
not a setwise block because Cb1(i,m) = m 6= im;
• allocation E is strongly setwise stable.
x a b c d e f g
µ(x) (b1,s1) (b1,s2) (b2,s1) (b2,s2) (b1,s1) (b1,s2) (b2,s1)
x h i j k l m n
µ(x) (b2,s2) (b1,s1) (b1,s2) (b2,s1) (b2,s2) (b1,s2) (b2,s1)
Table 1: Example 1 – the bilateral structure of contracts.
10allocation buyer b1 buyer b2 seller s1 seller s2
E ej
m n
D im nl in ml
C ij kl ik jl
B ef gh eg fh
A ab cd ac bd
E e j
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
... ... ... ...
Table 2: Example 1 – preferences and allocations A, B, C, D, E.
4.2 Stability and Substitutability
In his seminal paper Roth (1984b) proved that the set of pairwise stable matchings is
nonempty for substitutable preferences. Here, we prove that weak setwise stability and pair-
wise stability coincide. Hence, for substitutable preferences we have found a setwise blocking
concept that induces a nonempty set of stable allocations. Furthermore, we provide a match-
ing market with substitutable preferences for which the remaining set inclusion relations are
strict and cite a matching market with substitutable preferences without setwise stable allo-
cations.
Theorem 2. The “Onion Structure of Stable Allocations” - Substitutable
Preferences
(i) For matching markets with substitutable preferences an allocation is weakly setwise stable
if and only if it is pairwise stable.
(ii) For matching markets with substitutable preferences the set of pairwise (weakly setwise)
stable matchings is nonempty.
Hence, (i) and (ii) imply that for all matching markets with substitutable preferences R ∈ R,
SSS(R) ⊆ SS(R) ⊆ WSS(R) = PS(R) 6= ∅.
(iii) There exist matching markets with substitutable preferences R ∈ R such that SSS(R)  
SS(R) and SS(R)   WSS(R) = PS(R).
(iv) There exist matching markets with substitutable preferences R ∈ R such that SS(R) = ∅.
Proof. (i) Let R be substitutable. By Theorem 1 (i), WSS(R) ⊆ PS(R). It remains to prove
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Figure 1: Example 1 – a “stable matching onion” and allocations A, B, C, D, E.
Assume that allocation A is weakly setwise blocked (WSB) (and, without loss of generality,
individually rational), i.e., there exists a coalition N0 = B0∪S0 and a set of contracts X0 ∈ A
such that for all x ∈ X0 \ A, µ(x) ∈ B0 × S0, for all i ∈ N0, X0
i 6= Ai and X0
i = Ci(A ∪ X0),
and for all j ∈ N \ N0, X0
j ⊆ Aj. Then, there exist b ∈ B0, s ∈ S0, and x ∈ X0 \ A such that
µ(x) = (b,s).
Let i ∈ {b,s} and assume that x 6∈ Ci(A∪x) or, equivalently, x ∈ NCi(A∪x). Note that
(A ∪ x) ⊆ (A ∪ X0
i). Then, by substitutability (SUB’), x ∈ NCi(A ∪ X0
i). But then, since
x ∈ X0
i, X0
i 6= Ci(A ∪ X0
i); a contradiction. Thus, x ∈ Cb(A ∪ x) and x ∈ Cs(A ∪ x) and
allocation A is pairwise blocked (PB). So, any allocation A that is weakly setwise blocked is
also pairwise blocked. Hence, PS(R) ⊆ WSS(R).
Note that substitutability is a crucial assumption for our proof of the identity of WSS(R)
and PS(R). A simple example of a situation where WSS(R) 6= PS(R) is Example 2.
(ii) Roth (1984b, Theorem 1) proved for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and
substitutable preferences that the set of pairwise stable matchings is nonempty.
(iii) With Example 3 we introduce a matching market with substitutable preferences R ∈
R such that SSS(R)   SS(R). With Example 4 we introduce a matching market with
substitutable preferences R ∈ R such that SS(R)   WSS(R) = PS(R).5
(iv) Blair (1988, Example 2.6) presented a matching market with substitutable preferences
(without contracts) to demonstrate that the core of a many-to-many matching market with
substitutable preferences can be empty. It is easy to check that for this example (see also
Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Example 6.9), SS(R) = ∅.
5In their Example 4, Konishi and ¨ Unver (2006) provide a 16-agent many-to-many matching market (without
contracts) that also exhibits SS(R)   PS(R).
12Example 2. PS(R) 6= WSS(R) if preferences of one agent are not substitutable.
We consider a matching market with two buyers and two sellers and a set of contracts X =
{a,b,c}. Table 3 indicates the bilateral structure of contracts in X. Table 4 ﬁrst lists agents’
preferences in its columns. Note that b1’s preferences are not substitutable while all other
agent’s preferences are. Second, we list the following allocations for matching market R in
the rows of Table 4: A = {c} and B = {a,b}. Obviously, allocation A is pairwise stable.
However, it can be weakly setwise blocked by {b1,s1,s2} who agree upon allocation B. Hence,
PS(R) = {A,B} 6= {B} = WSS(R).
x a b c
µ(x) (b1,s1) (b1,s2) (b2,s1)
Table 3: Example 2 – the bilateral structure of contracts.
allocation buyer b1 buyer b2 seller s1 seller s2
B ab a b
A ∅ c c ∅
a ∅ ∅
b ac
Table 4: Example 2 – preferences and allocations A and B.
Example 3. SSS(R) ( SS(R) for substitutable preferences.
We consider a matching market with two buyers and two sellers and a set of contracts X =
{a,b,c,d,e,f}. Table 5 indicates the bilateral structure of contracts in X. Table 6 ﬁrst lists
agents’ substitutable preferences in its columns. Second, we list the following allocations
for matching market R in the rows of Table 6: A = {a,b}, B = {c,d,e,f}, and C =
{c,f}. Finally, Figure 2 illustrates that for matching market R we have SSS(R)   SS(R) =
WSS(R) = PS(R). To be speciﬁc,
• allocation A is pairwise and (weakly) setwise stable, but strongly setwise blocked via
allocation B, which is not a setwise block because Cb1(c,d) = c;
• allocation C is strongly setwise stable.
x a b c d e f
µ(x) (b1,s1) (b2,s2) (b1,s1) (b1,s2) (b2,s1) (b2,s2)
Table 5: Example 3 – the bilateral structure of contracts.
13allocation buyer b1 buyer b2 seller s1 seller s2
C c f
e d
B cd ef ce df
A a b a b
d e
C c f
ad eb ae bd
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅






. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 2: Example 3 – SSS(R) ( SS(R)(= WSS(R) = PS(R)) for substitutable preferences.
Example 4. SS(R) ( WSS(R) = PS(R) for substitutable preferences
We consider a matching market with two buyers and two sellers and a set of contracts X =
{a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h}. Table 7 indicates the bilateral structure of contracts in X. Table 8 ﬁrst
lists agents’ substitutable preferences in its columns. Second, we list the following allocations
for matching market R in the rows of Table 8: A = {a,b,c,d} and B = {e,f,g,h}. Finally,
Figure 3 illustrates that for matching market R we have SS(R)   WSS(R) = PS(R). To be
speciﬁc,
• allocation A is pairwise and weakly setwise stable but not setwise stable (B setwise
blocks allocation A but is not a weakly setwise block because e.g., Cb1(abef) = af 6= ef).
• allocation B is setwise stable.
x a b c d e f g h
µ(x) (b1,s1) (b1,s2) (b2,s1) (b2,s2) (b1,s1) (b1,s2) (b2,s1) (b2,s2)
Table 7: Example 4 – the bilateral structure of contracts.
14allocation buyer b1 buyer b2 seller s1 seller s2
af dg ce bh
B ef gh eg fh
A ab cd ac bd
be ch ag df
f g e h
b c a d
a d c b
e h g f
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
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Figure 3: Example 4 – SS(R) ( WSS(R) = PS(R) for substitutable preferences.
Remark 1. Setwise Stability in Roth (1984b)
Theorem 1 in Roth (1984b) states that for many-to-many matching markets with contracts
and substitutable preferences the set of (setwise) stable matchings is nonempty. In the Ap-
pendix we discuss how Roth’s (1984b) deﬁnition of setwise stability relates to the deﬁnitions
as introduced in Section 3. In particular, we demonstrate that setwise stability as introduced
in Sotomayor (1999) and Roth (1984b) are not logically related for general preferences.
154.3 Stability and Strong Substitutability
If one market-side has strong substitutable preferences and the other market-side has substi-
tutable preferences, setwise stability, weak setwise stability, and pairwise stability coincide.
Echenique and Oviedo (2006, see Theorem 6.1, Proposition 6.3, and Theorem 6.4) proved
this result for many-to-many matching markets. Since we consider many-to-many matching
markets with contracts, our result implies theirs as a special case (in addition, here we give
a direct and shorter proof). Since strong substitutability implies substitutability, Theorem 2
implies that the set of setwise stable matchings is nonempty. Furthermore, we provide a
matching market with strongly substitutable preferences for which the set of strongly setwise
stable matchings is a strict subset of the set of setwise stable matchings and a matching
market with strongly substitutable preferences without strongly setwise stable allocations.
Theorem 3. The “Onion Structure of Stable Allocations” - Strongly Substitutable
Preferences
(i) Suppose sellers (buyers) have strong substitutable preferences and buyers (sellers) have
substitutable preferences. Then, an allocation is setwise stable if and only if it is pairwise
stable. Hence, for all such matching markets R ∈ R, SS(R) = WSS(R) = PS(R) 6= ∅.
(ii) There exist matching markets with strongly substitutable preferences R ∈ R such that
SSS(R)   SS(R).
(iii) There exist matching markets with strongly substitutable preferences R ∈ R such that
SSS(R) = ∅.
Proof. (i) By Theorem 1, SS(R) ⊆ WSS(R) ⊆ PS(R). We complete the proof by showing
that PS(R) ⊆ SS(R).
Assume that allocation A is setwise blocked (SB) (and, without loss of generality, indi-
vidually rational), i.e., there exists a coalition N0 = B0 ∪ S0 and a set of contracts X0 ∈ A
such that for all x ∈ X0 \ A, µ(x) ∈ B0 × S0, for all i ∈ N0, X0
i Pi Ai and X0
i = Ci(X0
i), and
for all j ∈ N \ N0, X0
j ⊆ Aj. Let b ∈ B0. Then, by individual rationality of A and X0
b Pb Ab,
Cb(X0 ∪ A) * A and there exist x ∈ X0 \ A with µ(x) = (b,s) such that x ∈ Cb(X0 ∪ A). By
substitutability of buyer’s preferences (SUB), x ∈ Cb(A ∪ {x}).
Assume that x 6∈ Cs(A ∪ x) or, equivalently, x ∈ NCi(A ∪ x). Hence, Cs(A ∪ x) =
Cs(A) = As. Since x ∈ X0 \ A, X0 ∪ x = X0 and Cs(X0 ∪ x) = Cs(X0) = X0
s. Thus, X0
s Ps As
implies Cs(X0 ∪ x) Ps Cs(A ∪ x). By strong substitutability of seller’s preferences (SSUB’),
x ∈ NCi(X0 ∪ x); contradicting Cs(X0 ∪ x) = X0
s. Hence, x ∈ Cs(A ∪ x).
Thus, x ∈ Cb(A ∪ x) and x ∈ Cs(A ∪ x) and allocation A is pairwise blocked (PB). So,
any allocation A that is setwise blocked is also pairwise blocked. Hence, PS(R) ⊆ SS(R).
Note that strong substitutability is a crucial assumption for our proof of the identity of
SS(R) and PS(R). A simple example (with substitutable preferences) of a situation where
SS(R) 6= PS(R) is Blair (1988, Example 2.6).
(ii) Preferences in Example 3 are actually strongly substitutable. Hence, this example is a
matching market with strongly substitutable preferences R ∈ R such that SSS(R)   SS(R).
(iii) With Example 5 we introduce a matching market with strongly substitutable preferences
R ∈ R such that SSS(R) = ∅.
16Example 5. Strongly Substitutable Preferences and an Empty Set of Strongly Set-
wise Stable Matchings
We consider a matching market with three buyers and three sellers and a set of contracts
X = {a,b,c,d,e,f,h,i}. Table 9 indicates the bilateral structure of contracts in X. Table 10
lists agents’ strongly substitutable preferences in its columns. To check that there exists no
strongly setwise stable allocation, we start with the observation that no allocation that assigns
all agents a set of contracts below their respective (complete) set of contracts (i.e., allocation
X) can be strongly setwise stable (agents can use all their contracts to block). Note that for
instance A = {a,d,g} is pairwise (and weakly setwise) stable; the only feasible blocking (X)
is not individually rational. Next, no allocation that assigns an agent her (complete) set of
contracts can be strongly setwise stable since any such agent would be better oﬀ by canceling
one of the contracts. Thus, at least one agent has to receive her best set of contracts. For
instance, assume that there exists a strongly setwise stable allocation B at which buyer b1
obtains contracts a and b. Then, seller s2 has to obtain only contract b (no other contract
set containing b is individually rational for seller s2). But then agents b2 and s2 could block
allocation B using contract d. So, no such strongly setwise stable allocation B at which buyer
b1 obtains her best set of contracts exists. Similarly, we can prove that no strongly setwise
stable allocation B at which agent i ∈ {b2,b3,s1,s2,s3} obtains her best set of contracts
exists. Hence, no allocation can be strongly setwise stable.
x a b c d e
µ(x) (b1,s1) (b1,s2) (b1,s3) (b2,s2) (b2,s3)
x f g h i
µ(x) (b2,s1) (b3,s3) (b3,s1) (b3,s2)
Table 9: Example 5 – the bilateral structure of contracts.
buyer b1 buyer b2 buyer b3 seller s1 seller s2 seller s3
ab de gh af di cg
abc def ghi afh bdi cge
a d g a d g
ac df gi ah bd eg
bc ef hi fh bi ce
b e h f i c
c f i h b e
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Table 10: Example 5 – preferences.
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18Appendix: Roth’s (1984b) (Setwise) Stability
Roth’s (1984b) deﬁnition of (setwise) stability does not coincide with the notions introduced
in Section 3. Roth also strengthened the (setwise) blocking condition and thereby weakened
(setwise) stability. He required that all members of the blocking coalition obtain a subset
of their best set of contracts among their original contracts and the new contracts of the
blocking coalition.
A set of agents N0 = B0 ∪ S0 Roth blocks an allocation A if
(RSB) there exists a set of contracts Y 0 ∈ A such that
(1) ∪x∈Y 0µ(x) = B0 × S0 and
(2) for all i ∈ N0, Y 0
i ⊆ Ci(A ∪ Y 0) Pi Ai.
An allocation A is Roth stable if it is individually rational (IR) and no set of agents can Roth
block allocation A [not (RSB)]. By RSS(R) ⊆ A we denote the set of Roth stable allocations
for matching market R.
We now show that there is a set inclusion relation between all stability notions introduced
so far if instead of setwise stability we consider Roth stability. On the other hand, Roth
stability and setwise stability are not logically related. Hence, Roth (1984b) and Sotomayor
(1999) refer to diﬀerent stability notions when they use the term (setwise) stability.
Proposition 1. Roth Stability and General Preferences
(i) For all matching markets R ∈ R, SSS(R) ⊆ RSS(R) ⊆ WSS(R) ⊆ PS(R).
(ii) There exist matching markets R ∈ R such that SS(R) ( RSS(R).
(iii) There exist matching markets R ∈ R such that RSS(R) ( SS(R).
Proof. (i) Consider matching market R ∈ R.
By the deﬁnitions of strongly setwise blocking (SSB) and Roth setwise blocking (RSB) it
is clear that any allocation A that is Roth setwise blocked is also strongly setwise blocked.
Hence, SSS(R) ⊆ RSS(R).
Assume that allocation A is weakly setwise blocked (WSB), i.e., there exists a coalition
N0 = B0 ∪ S0 and a set contracts X0 ∈ A such that for all x ∈ X0 \ A, µ(x) ∈ B0 × S0, for all
i ∈ N0, X0
i 6= Ai and X0
i = Ci(A ∪ X0), and for all j ∈ N \ N0, X0
j ⊆ Aj. Let Y 0 := X0 \ A.
Then, for all i ∈ N0, Y 0
i ⊆ Ci(A ∪ Y 0) Pi Ai. So, any allocation A that is weakly setwise
blocked is also Roth setwise blocked. Hence, RSS(R) ⊆ WSS(R).
(ii) For Example 4, SS(R) ( WSS(R) = RSS(R).
(iii) With Example 6 we introduce a matching market R ∈ R such that RSS(R) ( SS(R).
19Example 6. RSS(R) ( SS(R) for General Preferences
We consider a matching market with three buyers and two sellers and a set of contracts X =
{a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j}. Table 11 indicates the bilateral structure of contracts in X. Table 12
ﬁrst lists agents’ preferences in its columns. Second, we indicate the unique individually
rational allocation for matching market R in the second row of Table 12: A = {a,b,d,e,i,j}.
Obviously, allocation A is setwise stable and SS(R) = {A}. However, it can be Roth setwise
blocked by {b1,b2,b3,s1,s2} and Y 0 = {c,f,g,h}. Hence, RSS(R) = ∅ ( {A} = SS(R).
Note, that the Roth block Y 0 is not an individually rational allocation.
x a b c d e
µ(x) (b1,s1) (b1,s2) (b1,s2) (b2,s1) (b2,s2)
x f g h i j
µ(x) (b2,s1) (b3,s1) (b3,s2) (b3,s1) (b3,s1)
Table 11: Example 6 – the bilateral structure of contracts.
allocation buyer b1 buyer b2 buyer b3 seller s1 seller s2
c f gh afg ceh
A ab de ij adi bej
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
... ... ... ... ...
Table 12: Example 6 – preferences and allocation A.
Remark 2. Roth Stability and Substitutable Preferences
For substitutable preferences, Roth (1984b) proved that Roth stability coincides with pairwise
stability (Roth, 1984b, Lemma 2) and that the set of pairwise stable matchings is always
nonempty (Roth, 1984b, Theorem 1).
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